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There is a widely shared belief that the Supreme Court’s Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) doctrine is far too solicitous of arbitration and 
not sufficiently solicitous of state lawmaking power.  That may be so, 
but the Court has interpreted one provision of the FAA, the savings 
clause, to permit the application of state law to invalidate otherwise 
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enforceable arbitration agreements.  This Article examines the 
savings clause and its impact on provisions in arbitration agreements 
that interfere with the ability of claimants to effectively enforce 
substantive federal- or state-law rights. 
The Court’s interpretation of the savings clause as preserving a 
role for state law is dicta.  A better reading is that the savings clause 
authorizes federal courts to create federal common law to govern the 
enforcement of covered arbitration agreements.  That alternative 
interpretation is consistent with the Court’s treatment of the rest of 
the statute; it is consistent with an analogous regulatory scheme—
federal common law regulation of the enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements—and it reflects a division of lawmaking 
authority that would have been familiar to the Congress that passed 
the FAA in 1925.  Moreover, while there are no doubt legitimate state 
interests in regulating arbitration agreements and guaranteeing 
parties a judicial forum for the assertion of certain rights, that alone 
does not require application of state law to FAA-covered arbitration 
agreements.  Like it or not, Congress has the authority to regulate the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in interstate commerce, and a 
necessary consequence is the displacement of some overlapping state 
law. 
A fully federalized savings clause would result in the development 
of a uniform body of arbitration law, and that body of law could 
prove to be at least as effective, and perhaps even more effective, in 
addressing the major arbitration issue of our time: the imposition on 
relatively weak parties, like consumers and employees, of agreements 
that effectively deprive those parties of the right to assert their 
federal- or state-law rights.  This nascent body of federal common 
law helps shed light on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T 
v. Concepcion and helps chart a post-Concepcion approach to the 
issue of “lopsided” arbitration agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
he Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) jurisprudence 
has been, to put it mildly, much maligned.1  Perhaps the most 
 
1 E.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent 
with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its 
own creation.”); Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in 
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 326, 327 (2007) (“I regard the set of Supreme Court arbitration 
decisions to create an atrophied role for state arbitration regulation, to ignore respected, 
T
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common criticism is that this “simple procedural statute enacted to 
require enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court” has 
been transformed by the Court into a source of substantive federal 
arbitration law that governs and favors the enforcement of virtually 
every arbitration agreement entered into in the United States and 
displaces otherwise applicable state law.2  That “simple procedural 
statute” provides, in § 2: 
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.3 
At ground zero of this critique is the Court’s 1984 decision in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating that the FAA applied in a state court 
 
long-standing tenets of federalism, and to use a strange, unorthodox mode of preemption 
analysis almost preordained to overwhelm state arbitration law.”); Margaret L. Moses, 
Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law 
Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 157–58 (2006) (“[T]here is no 
change of mores or understanding that supports the extraordinary rewriting of the FAA by 
the Supreme Court[,] . . . which leads back to the Lochner era, when state protective 
legislation . . . was struck down in the name of ‘freedom of contract’ . . . .”); Richard C. 
Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S. Supreme Court, A.B.A. 
J., Oct. 1996, at 16, 16 (reporting that two justices on the Montana Supreme Court 
described “the United States Supreme Court’s decision[s] in . . . cases which interpret and 
apply the Federal Arbitration Act” as “legally unfounded, socially detrimental and 
philosophically misguided”); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New 
Rules, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 12) (“The Supreme Court is as 
irretrievably lost in its arbitration jurisprudence as it has ever been in any line of cases        
. . . .”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1761675. 
2 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence: 
How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 61 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 8) (“It is well-known that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the . . . 
FAA in pivotal cases from the late 20th century rendered virtually all arbitration 
agreements in most contracts governed by federal law.”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809005; Moses, supra note 1, at 99; 
see also Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of 
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1353 (1985) (The FAA “is now definitively 
established as a substantive federal law, preemptive and binding on the states, and 
articulating a federal policy extending to issues well beyond its literal terms.”). 
3 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  There is universal agreement that Congress passed the FAA to 
overcome the unwillingness of federal judges to order specific enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.  E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) 
(stating that “[t]he FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements”); Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 1189, 1228 (2011) (“[T]he FAA was first and foremost a response to the ancient 
common law hostility toward arbitration . . . .”); Cunningham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 
2) (observing that Congress reversed the hostility of nineteenth-century judges to 
arbitration when it passed the FAA in 1925).  But beyond that, the consensus breaks down. 
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where a state-law claim was being asserted and preempted a state 
statute barring arbitration of disputes between franchisees and 
franchisors.4  The majority declared that “the Federal Arbitration Act 
creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor 
arbitration agreements.”5  Thus, the Court held that the FAA common 
law it had previously applied in federal court applied, like all federal 
substantive law, in state court as well.  A principal tenet of that body 
of law, as one example, was expressed by the Court one year before 
Southland, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp.6  There the Court declared, “Section 2 [of the 
FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements . . . .  The [Federal] Arbitration Act 
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration     
. . . .”7 
Other decisions central to the Court’s consolidation of the FAA as 
the arbitration law of the land include Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 
Inc. v. Dobson, in which the Court held that the FAA’s application to 
arbitration agreements in “contract[s] evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce” extended to the full reach of Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause.8  In a series of cases beginning with 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court 
concluded that the FAA required enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate virtually any federal statutory claim.9  And finally, in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court held that the FAA’s exclusion 
from coverage of contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate 
commerce should be read narrowly, to exclude from the reach of the 
FAA only arbitration agreements in the employment contracts of 
“transportation workers.”10 
Thus, for example, it is settled law that the FAA would apply (1) in 
an action brought in state court in California by a discharged 
employee claiming that her discharge was wrongful under state law 
and (2) in an action by a similar employee in federal court for a 
 
4 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3–17 (1984). 
5 Id. at 15 n.9. 
6 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
7 Id. at 24–25. 
8 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
9 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (federal antitrust claim). 
10 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
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violation of Title VII.  To be more specific, the federal substantive 
law of arbitration would apply if the defendant in either case sought a 
stay of the litigation and an order compelling the plaintiff to arbitrate 
based on an arbitration provision in her employment contract.11 
I do not intend to take sides on the question whether the Court has 
erred in its cases interpreting the FAA to have such wide application.  
Instead, I want to focus on a surprisingly unexamined provision of § 2 
of the FAA—the “savings clause”—which provides an exception to 
the rule mandating specific enforcement of written arbitration 
agreements in contracts in interstate commerce.  Under the savings 
clause, such agreements are “enforceable save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”12 
There are at least two notable aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the savings clause.  First, in contrast to its holding in 
Southland and other cases that the FAA authorizes the creation of a 
federal common law of arbitration, the Court has stated repeatedly 
that the reference in the savings clause to “such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” is a reference to 
state law.13  Second, that reading of the savings clause is dicta, and it 
appears that neither the Justices nor the parties to relevant cases 
before the Court spent much time or energy considering alternative 
interpretations.14 
Thus, to return to our hypothetical employment-law disputes, under 
the prevailing interpretation of the savings clause, the plaintiff in each 
could argue that the arbitration agreement in the employment contract 
was not enforceable because it was unconscionable, and that 
argument would be resolved by reference to California’s common law 
of contracts.  That was the setting for the Supreme Court’s latest FAA 
case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,15 and that is the state of 
affairs I want to examine. 
 
11 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (providing for applications for a stay of proceedings and petitions to 
enforce arbitration agreements).  The Act also provides for judicial enforcement of awards 
and, under limited circumstances, for modification or vacation of awards.  Id. §§ 9, 10. 
12 Id. § 2. 
13 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
14 See infra Part I. 
15 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  For a discussion of the reasons for the high incidence of 
arbitration cases in which unconscionability challenges to enforcement were raised, at 
least prior to Concepcion, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: 
Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 
(2008). 
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Specifically, in Concepcion the Court was asked to determine 
whether the savings clause authorized a court to apply California 
contract law to refuse to enforce a class action waiver in an arbitration 
provision tucked away in a cell phone contract.16  The Court 
concluded that although the class action waiver would be deemed 
unconscionable and unenforceable under California law, state law 
could not be applied to the agreement under the savings clause 
because the savings clause does not “preserve state-law rules that 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”17 
How courts determine the enforceability of class action waivers 
and other provisions in arbitration agreements between businesses and 
consumers or employees that reduce the likelihood those consumers 
or employees will successfully enforce state- or federal-law rights is 
central to the question whether arbitration is an appropriate means of 
resolving those disputes.  And that question turns in part on the 
meaning of the savings clause. 
I will explain that the savings clause should never have been read 
to require the application of state law to disputes over the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.  Instead, 
it should be read to authorize federal courts to create federal common 
law to govern the enforcement of covered arbitration agreements.  
Readers familiar with federal labor law may instantly appreciate the 
analogy to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
 
16 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744–45. 
17 Id. at 1748.  The plaintiffs in Concepcion filed a class action in federal district court 
asserting state-law claims against AT&T for charging sales tax on phones it advertised as 
free.  Id. at 1774.  AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its sales and 
service contract with the Concepcions, who contended the arbitration provisions were 
unconscionable under California law because they did not permit the arbitration to proceed 
on a class-wide basis.  Id. at 1744–45.  The relevant California common law doctrine 
provided that a class action waiver in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting that 
predictably involved a small amount of damages is unconscionable and unenforceable 
where “it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money.”  Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 
2005)).  The Court acknowledged that it had previously referred to the state law of 
unconscionability as a “generally applicable” contract-law doctrine ordinarily applicable 
under the savings clause, but nevertheless concluded the California doctrine was 
preempted by the FAA.  Id. at 1748.  Requiring the availability of class-wide arbitration, 
the Court concluded, “interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration,” because class-
wide arbitration is slower, more formal, more expensive, and riskier for defendants, all of 
which would make it less likely that parties would enter into arbitration agreements, a 
result contrary to the purpose of the FAA.  Id. at 1746–53. 
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(LMRA),18 which was famously interpreted by the Court in Textile 
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills to authorize federal courts to create a 
federal common law of contracts for collective bargaining agreements 
covered by the National Labor Relations Act.19 
I begin by explaining in some detail why I have concluded that the 
Court’s statements that the savings clause refers to state law lack a 
solid foundation.20  I will then quickly take stock of the resulting 
FAA doctrine, a sometimes mystifying mix of federal and state law.  
The incorporation of state contract law into the FAA enforcement 
equation through the savings clause results, predictably, in disparate 
treatment of identical arbitration agreements.  Perhaps less 
predictably, the Court has created complicated and indeterminate 
rules for identifying which state laws are “saved” by the savings 
clause, rules that make it difficult to predict outcomes and that 
therefore lead to litigation over enforcement issues.21 
Next, I will explain that the 1925 Congress that passed the FAA 
was sufficiently familiar with federal common law—although it was 
federal common law of the Swift v. Tyson22 variety—that the 
reference in the savings clause to “grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract” could have been a reference to 
federal rather than state law.  In that Part, I also show that section 301 
of the Labor Management Relations Act is a helpful model for 
thinking about a more completely federalized Federal Arbitration 
Act.23 
I then respond to what I consider to be the two most likely and 
important critiques of a more fully federalized FAA.  First, I evaluate 
the possible harm to federalism values associated with displacement 
of state law from the savings clause.24  In the final Part, I respond to 
the argument that if state contract law is not available through the 
savings clause, courts would have no basis for denying enforcement 
of arbitration agreements that prevent the non-drafting party from 
vindicating substantive rights.25  I do so by examining an extant 
interpretation of the FAA—federal common law—that directs courts 
 
18 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). 
19 353 U.S. 448, 456–58 (1957). 
20 See infra Part I. 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part V. 
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to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements that so strongly favor one 
party that they constitute a waiver of the substantive rights of the 
other.  Reliance on and development of that body of federal law 
would make American arbitration law more coherent without 
sacrificing the capacity of courts to deny enforcement of agreements 
that constitute substantive law waivers.  Understanding the distinction 
between this body of federal law and the state law of 
unconscionability is essential to evaluating the impact of Concepcion 
on the major arbitration issue of our time—the imposition on 
consumers and employees of arbitration agreements that effectively 
deprive them of the ability to vindicate their federal- or state-law 
rights.26 
I 
THE SUPREME COURT’S BREEZY INTERPRETATION OF THE SAVINGS 
CLAUSE IN PERRY V. THOMAS 
In Perry v. Thomas, a stockbroker filed suit against his former 
employer and two former colleagues in California state court, 
claiming that their failure to pay him commissions violated California 
law.27  The defendants sought orders compelling arbitration under the 
FAA based on an arbitration provision in the plaintiff’s application 
for securities industry registration.28  The plaintiff successfully 
resisted arbitration on the ground that the California Labor Code 
required a judicial forum for actions to recover wages, regardless of 
any agreement to the contrary.29  The California courts determined 
that the state statute was not preempted by the FAA.30 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.31  Its holding followed from a 
fairly simple application of Southland, in which the Court had held 
that the FAA applied in state court and preempted inconsistent state 
laws.32  The FAA’s clear federal policy of enforcing arbitration 
 
26 As Myriam Gilles noted years ago, one particularly potent form of substantive law 
waiver is the class action waiver in an arbitration agreement, waivers businesses are in a 
position to impose on consumers, employees, and shareholders.  Myriam Gilles, Opting 
Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 412–25 (2005). 
27 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987). 
28 Id. at 485. 
29 Id. at 486. 
30 Id. at 486–89. 
31 Id. at 489. 
32 Id. 
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agreements, reasoned the Court in Perry, was “in unmistakable 
conflict with California’s . . . requirement that litigants be provided a 
judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.  Therefore, under the 
Supremacy Clause, the state statute must give way.”33 
Neither the state courts nor the Supreme Court in Perry addressed 
the plaintiff’s alternative ground for resisting arbitration—that the 
arbitration agreement was “an unconscionable, unenforceable contract 
of adhesion.”34  Nevertheless, the Court “note[d] . . . the choice-of-
law issue that arises when defenses such as Thomas’ . . . 
unconscionability arguments are asserted.”35  The subsequent 
importance of the Court’s footnote justifies quoting it at length: 
 We also decline to address Thomas’ claim that the arbitration 
agreement in this case constitutes an unconscionable, unenforceable 
contract of adhesion.  This issue was not decided below . . . . 
 We note, however, the choice-of-law issue that arises when 
defenses such as Thomas’ . . . unconscionability arguments are 
asserted.  In instances such as these, the text of § 2 provides the 
touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the 
principles of federal common law envisioned by the passage of that 
statute: An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, as a matter of federal law, “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Thus 
state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if 
that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, 
and enforceability of contracts generally.  A state-law principle that 
takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate 
is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2.  A court 
may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an 
arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different 
from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements 
under state law.  Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an 
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the 
court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot.36 
 
33 Id. at 490–91.  The state courts had, the Court explained, misread Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), which held that the same 
California statute was not preempted by an SEC rule promulgated under the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act.  Perry, 482 U.S. at 490.  The Court explained that the issue of 
the preemptive effect of the FAA had not been before it in Ware.  Id. at 491. 
34 Id. at 487 n.4, 488 n.6, 492 n.9.  Plaintiff was prepared to argue that the denial of 
meaningful discovery would compromise his claim for relief, and the selection of 
arbitrators was to be made by the New York Stock Exchange, which he claimed was 
“presumptively biased in favor of management.”  Id. at 487 n.4. 
35 Id. at 492 n.9. 
36 Id. (citations omitted). 
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This footnote constitutes the Court’s entire treatment of the issue, 
and it has come to stand for the proposition that the reference in the 
savings clause to “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract” is a reference to state-law grounds, as 
distinguished from what the Court referred to as the “principles of 
federal common law envisioned by the passage of [the FAA].”37  The 
subsequent reliance on the Court’s Perry footnote stands as a 
paradigmatic example of the perils of reliance on dicta. 
The litigants in Perry barely addressed the issue of the content of 
the savings clause in their briefs.  The defendants’ initial merits brief 
was silent on the unconscionability issue.38  The plaintiff raised the 
unconscionability defense to enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
in his brief, but he did not address the choice-of-law issue.39  In their 
reply brief, the defendants suggested that a choice-of-law issue was 
presented by Thomas’s unconscionability argument, but they stated 
simply that “state law has no applicability” in cases governed by the 
FAA.40  No amicus briefs were filed in the case.41 Not surprisingly, 
the choice-of-law issue received little attention during the oral 
argument.  What is surprising is that Thomas’s counsel argued, as had 
the defendants in their brief, that “federal common law” should 
govern the resolution of the unconscionability defense.42  The 
defendants’ counsel did not address the issue at argument.  Thus, the 
litigants and the Justices virtually ignored the choice-of-law issue, and 
 
37 Id. 
38 See Reply Brief of Appellants, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (No. 86-566), 
1987 WL 880214. 
39 Thomas simply cited one California Court of Appeals decision in support of the 
unconscionability argument, a case to which the Federal Arbitration Act did not even 
apply.  Brief of Appellee on the Merits at 22–24, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) 
(No. 86-566), 1987 WL 880213 (discussing Hope v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). 
40 Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 38, at *11–12. 
41 Docket Sheet, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (No. 86-566) (copy on file with 
author). 
42 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (No. 86-
566), 1987 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 175, at *25 (“[I]t fails [sic] upon this Court as a matter of 
Federal common law to carve out, those exceptions to the Federal Arbitration Act that 
Congress intended when it enacted the savings clause in Section 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.”); id. at *27 (“Your Honor, we believe that there is a Federal common law 
that would protect the wage earner on [sic] this case and that Section 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act says that there are exceptions.  It does not define what the exceptions 
are.”); id. at *38 (“Well, I believe it falls upon the judiciary to fashion the limitations on 
the Federal Arbitration Act . . . as a matter of Federal common law, and I believe in so 
fashioning such a remedy that the Court would draw upon basic senses of fairness and fair 
play.”). 
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when it did come up, the litigants seemed to agree that federal 
common law, and not state law, controlled the resolution of disputes 
about enforceability governed by the savings clause. 
The Court’s subsequent conclusion to the contrary—that state law 
applied—was not well reasoned.  At oral argument, one Justice 
remarked, “[W]e don’t have any independent law of contracts here, 
since Erie Railroad against Tompkins, it is up to California to decide 
what a California contact [sic] means.”43  Perhaps this statement was 
intended to encourage the parties to more fully develop the argument 
that Congress had authorized the federal courts to create federal 
common law in the savings clause; if not, it could reflect a 
remarkably unsophisticated understanding of Erie and its progeny 
from a Supreme Court Justice.  There is no doubt that the federal 
courts can create federal common law when authorized to do so by 
Congress in an area where Congress would have had the power to 
legislate directly.44 
The reasoning set forth in the Court’s footnote in Perry is 
superficial at best.  The Court wrote that “the text of § 2 provides the 
touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the 
principles of federal common law envisioned by the passage of [the 
FAA],”45 but there is nothing in that text, and nothing the Court 
points to, to support its conclusion that state law applies.  Recall that 
the savings clause provides in its entirety that arbitration agreements 
are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”46  There are no textual clues that 
this is a reference to state law. 
The only other support the Court offers for the conclusion that the 
savings clause refers to state law are citations to two previous 
decisions, neither of which addressed the choice-of-law issue: Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.47 and 
Southland.48  The question in Prima Paint was “whether the federal 
court or an arbitrator is to resolve a claim of ‘fraud in the 
 
43 Id. at *30 (referring to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937)). 
44 See Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A 
Reconceptualization of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 386–89 (2000) (describing 
several examples of post-Erie federal common law and noting the widespread 
misunderstanding that all federal common law was condemned by the Court in Erie). 
45 Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
46 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
47 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
48 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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inducement,’ under a contract governed by the [FAA].”49  The Court 
concluded that the question was for an arbitrator because the claim of 
fraud was not specifically directed at the arbitration provisions.50  
Prima Paint simply lends no support to the Court’s choice-of-law 
conclusion in Perry.  Indeed, if one were to try to divine any guidance 
from Prima Paint on the issue, it supports the conclusion that the 
FAA was intended to authorize federal courts to create a federal 
common law of arbitration.  The Court announced in Prima Paint that 
its “severability” doctrine, under which claims for fraud in the 
inducement of the arbitration provision itself are treated as separate 
from claims for fraud in the inducement of the agreement in which an 
arbitration provision appears, is a creature of federal law that governs 
notwithstanding state law to the contrary.51 
The Perry Court’s reference to Southland is also curious.  As 
already mentioned, the question in Southland was whether § 2 of the 
FAA applied in state court, and the Court concluded that it did 
because it was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.52  Thus, the 
Court’s holding in Southland does not support reading the savings 
clause to refer to state law—the Court held that the FAA preempted a 
state law that would have rendered the parties’ arbitration agreement 
unenforceable.53  And the Perry Court’s pinpoint citation to 
Southland54 offers at best only ambiguous support for its reading of 
the savings clause.  In that portion of the Southland opinion the 
 
49 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 396–97. 
50 Id. at 403–04. 
51 Id. at 400 n.3, 402–07; see also id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing the 
majority’s opinion as approving “the Second Circuit's fashioning of a federal separability 
rule which overrides state law to the contrary”); id. at 422 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court holds that the [FAA] gives federal courts the right to fashion federal law, 
inconsistent with state law, to determine whether an arbitration agreement was made and 
what it means.”). 
52 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10–15. 
53 Id. at 16 n.11.  The plaintiffs in Southland were class representatives of and 
individual 7-Eleven franchisees suing the franchisor in state court in California under 
California state common and statutory law.  Id. at 3–4.  One claim was based on franchisor 
obligations created by the California Franchise Investment Law, a statute interpreted by 
the California Supreme Court to require judicial resolution of contested claims.  Id. at 4–6.  
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, as applied to the parties’ arbitration agreements, 
the state law conflicted with the FAA and was preempted.  Id. at 16; see also id. at 10 (“In 
enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration 
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”); id. at 11–12 (“The 
Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under 
the Commerce Clause . . . rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal courts.”). 
54 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
YELNOSKY 3/19/2012  8:39 AM 
2012] Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act 741 
majority explained that while “a party may assert general contract 
defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement,” reading the FAA to allow states to pass statutes 
forbidding enforcement of arbitration agreements “would permit 
states to override the declared policy [of the FAA] requiring 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.”55  The conclusion that the 
Court’s reference to “general contract defenses” in Southland was to 
state law is not self-evident. 
Finally, just months ago, almost twenty-five years after Perry v. 
Thomas, a Justice finally pointed out that the footnote about the 
savings clause in Perry was dicta.  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, Justice Thomas wrote that 
 The statement in Perry v. Thomas suggesting that [the savings 
clause of] § 2 preserves all state-law defenses that “arose to govern 
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of 
contracts generally,” is dicta.  This statement is found in a footnote 
concerning a claim that the Court “decline[d] to address.”56 
Justice Thomas insisted in his concurrence that Perry would not 
prohibit interpreting the savings clause to refer to state-law defenses 
related only to the “making” of the arbitration agreement and not as 
well to state-law defenses related to the broader “validity, 
revocability, and enforceability” of the arbitration agreement, 
including any public policy defense.57 
Obviously, I agree with Justice Thomas that the Court’s footnote 
about the savings clause in Perry is dicta.  But note the bounded 
nature of the issue Justice Thomas claims remained undecided after 
Perry.  He wrote that the Court is free to interpret as an issue of first 
impression the meaning of the term “revocation” in the savings 
clause, but he assumed that the savings clause refers to state-law 
grounds for resisting enforcement of an arbitration agreement: “This 
Court has never addressed the question,” Justice Thomas wrote, 
“whether the state-law ‘grounds’ referred to in § 2 are narrower than 
those applicable to any contract.”58 
 
55 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.11. 
56 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 n.* (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
57 Id. at 1754–55 & n.*. 
58 Id. at 1755 n.* (emphasis added). 
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In this Part, I have tried to show that the Court has offered virtually 
no support for that assumption59 and that the scope of the savings 
clause question remaining unanswered after Perry is broader.  After 
stopping to describe current FAA savings clause doctrine and its 
complex mix of federal and state law, I will try to show that reading 
the savings clause instead to authorize application of federal law to 
disputes about agreements covered by the FAA is preferable. 
II 
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PERRY V. THOMAS REGIME 
A bad seed was sown in 1987 in Perry v. Thomas, and that seed 
has germinated and flourished.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
cited Perry for the proposition that the savings clause refers to 
generally applicable state contract law.60  The Court has never 
examined the choice-of-law issue any more closely than it did in 
Perry.  Instead, it has tried to integrate state law into a federal statute 
stating a presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, which has resulted in a tangled jurisprudence of 
arbitration-agreement enforcement. 
First, by incorporating state law into the FAA, the Court 
predictably raised the specter that identical agreements might be 
treated differently depending upon which state’s law applies.  That is 
an ordinarily unremarkable aspect of our federalism, but for the Court 
to incorporate state laws into a statute that it has held declares a 
 
59 The assumption that the law referred to in the savings clause is state law is virtually 
universal.  For example, Professors David Schwartz and Richard Bales, whose 
comprehensive work on the FAA has been justifiably influential, have written that the 
“‘savings clause’ makes clear that state law contract defenses apply to arbitration 
agreements, as to any other contracts,” David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act 
and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 557 (2004) (emphasis 
added), and that the FAA’s “express terms create room for state law,” Richard A. Bales, 
The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform Federal Standard 
Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 583, 601 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
60 E.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 
U.S. 681 (1996) and Perry and stating that “[t]he question in this case is whether § 2 
preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer 
contracts as unconscionable”); Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 
(2010) (quoting Casarotto and assuming Nevada law on unconscionability could render 
arbitration agreements unenforceable); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686–87 (“Repeating our 
observation in Perry, the text of § 2 declares that state law may be applied ‘if that law 
arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally.’”). 
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national policy favoring arbitration is at least curious.61  This 
variability makes it difficult for repeat players to develop common 
understandings of the provisions of their arbitration agreements.  For 
others, such as consumers or employees who are parties to adhesion 
contracts with arbitration provisions, their ability to retain the right to 
sue in court could depend on geography.62 
But the Perry dicta and its progeny have created much more 
complexity than the variability associated with incorporation of 
disparate state contract law into the FAA.63  The Court in Perry 
explained that only a subset of state contract law is applicable under 
the savings clause.  To be applicable, the Court explained, the state 
law must concern “the validity, revocability, and enforceability of 
contracts generally.”64  Thus, a state law that construed arbitration 
agreements in a way that deviated from the way in which other 
agreements were construed would be preempted and not applicable 
under the savings clause.65  The Court expanded on this distinction in 
subsequent cases, explaining that while “generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied 
to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2[,] . . . 
Congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for 
suspect status . . . .”66 
Determining whether a particular state law threads this needle has 
proven to be exceedingly difficult.  For example, in Concepcion the 
Court acknowledged that 
 When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular 
type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is 
 
61 That tension may well be a product of tension between the two main purposes of the 
FAA recognized by the Court: (1) to create a national policy favoring arbitration, and (2) 
to enforce arbitration agreements by putting them on the same footing as other contracts.  
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745–46 (The FAA “reflect[s] both a ‘liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration’ and the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’ 
. . . [C]ourts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts      
. . . .”). 
62 See Bales, supra note 59, at 622 (explaining that an arbitration agreement might be 
unconscionable under California but not Ohio law); G. Richard Shell, Federal Versus 
State Law in the Interpretation of Contracts Containing Arbitration Clauses: Reflections 
on Mastrobuono, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 43 (1996) (exploring this phenomenon in the context 
of securities industry arbitration). 
63 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 See id. 
66 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
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displaced by the FAA.  But the inquiry becomes more complex 
when a doctrine thought to be generally applicable, such as duress 
or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been 
applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.67 
Legal scholars had noted this complexity well before the Court 
acknowledged it in Concepcion.  The distinction between state laws 
that single out arbitration and generally applicable contract law has 
been called “fundamentally incoherent,”68 it has been shown to result 
in wildly contradictory preemption rulings,69 and the blended federal- 
and state-law approach of the FAA has been described as “a curious 
amalgam of federal and state law—a federal duty of fidelity to 
general state law—that seems to invite trouble.”70 
This complexity and its associated costs have their origin in the 
Court’s superficial reasoning in Perry that the savings clause refers to 
state law.  With that foundation established, I want to begin to 
consider in detail an alternative reading—that the reference is to 
federal common law.  In the next Part, I hope to show that such a 
reading would have been consistent with the prevailing understanding 
of the relationship between state law and federal common law in 
1925, and that the Court has read an analogous federal statute in this 
way. 
  
 
67 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (citations 
omitted). 
68 Schwartz, supra note 59, at 558–62, 568–70. 
69 Aragaki, supra note 3, at 1201 & n.75; see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s 
Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011).  Christoper Drahozal had previously noted 
the particular interpretive problem posed by a state law that applies to arbitration 
agreements and some other agreements, but not to all contracts, such as a state law 
prohibiting the enforcement of forum selection clauses.  Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal 
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 408–11 (2004) (documenting the uncertainty 
that exists in the courts over whether state law is sufficiently general to avoid preemption 
and whether a general contract law could, nevertheless, “single out” an arbitration clause 
and therefore be preempted); see also Cunningham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 38–40) 
(criticizing the Court’s “general” versus “singling out” test as inconsistent with the rich 
and dynamic reality of contract law doctrine). 
70 Bruhl, supra note 15, at 1489; see also id. at 1449–52 (explaining that it is often 
nearly impossible to determine whether a court is applying state unconscionability law 
evenhandedly as required by the FAA because there is often no ready and obvious 
nonarbitration analogue, and even when there is, the law of unconscionability is too 
indeterminate to tell whether a particular application discriminates against an arbitration 
agreement). 
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III 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAA, SECTION 301 OF THE 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, AND FEDERAL COMMON 
LAW 
The FAA was enacted in 1925, and it has never been meaningfully 
amended.71  It was modeled on the New York Arbitration Act, which 
was enacted in 1920.72  To say that it was copied is more precise—the 
resemblance between the relevant provisions of the two statutes is 
striking: 
1920 N.Y. Arbitration Law § 2 
A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising between the parties to the contract, 
or a submission hereafter entered into of an existing controversy to 
arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter seventeen of the code of 
civil procedure, shall be valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.73 
1925 U.S. Arbitration Act § 2 
[A] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, 
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.74 
 
71 E.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative 
History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 123 & n.147 (2002). 
72 See, e.g., Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little 
Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2038–39 (2011); Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. 
Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 175, 182–83 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in 
Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 17 (2004). 
73 Arbitration Law of 1920, c. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 804 (emphasis added). 
74 U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 25-401, § 2, 42 Stat. 883 (1925) (emphasis added). 
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There is nothing in the legislative history that sheds light on the 
question whether the reference in the savings clause to “such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” was 
meant to be a reference to state or federal law.75  Of course, the 
identical language in the New York statute was a reference to New 
York law, but the reference in the savings clause of the FAA must be 
to something other than New York contract law.  There is no 
definitive, contemporaneous statement of the intent of the 1925 
Congress regarding the savings clause, but I am comfortable making 
the following modest but not unimportant claim: some members of 
Congress, if they considered whether the reference was to state or 
federal law, would have likely concluded that it was a reference to 
federal common law. 
Judges and scholars who have considered the legislative history of 
the FAA have noted that when it was passed in 1925, the regime of 
Swift v. Tyson, which permitted federal courts to create federal 
common law in diversity cases, had been in place for over seventy-
five years.76  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins77 would not bring the 
Swift regime to an end until 1938.78  Thus, it would have been 
unremarkable if a member of Congress had concluded that the FAA 
directed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to 
federal common law to be created by those courts, including the 
grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.79  The savings clause seems no less an invitation to create 
federal common law than the federal diversity statute’s grant of 
jurisdiction to the district courts, upon which Swift v. Tyson stood. 
For example, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co. the Court noted “that the Arbitration Act was 
 
75 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1984) (“[I]t is an understatement 
to say that ‘the legislative history of the . . . Act reveals little awareness on the part of 
Congress that state law might be affected.’” (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (omissions in original)); see also Hirshman, supra note 2, at 1315 (“Little emerges 
from the legislative history other than unhappiness with prior law.” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
76 See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
77 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
78 E.g., Hirshman, supra note 2, at 1314–17. 
79 Perhaps the most anomalous aspect of the FAA, given that it is understood to be a 
source of substantive federal law, is that it does not create federal question jurisdiction.  
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).  
Under the FAA, a federal court may enter orders in proceedings pending before the court, 
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006), or proceedings over which the court would have jurisdiction absent an 
arbitration agreement, id. § 4. 
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passed 13 years before [the] decision in Erie . . . and that at the time 
of enactment Congress had reason to believe that it still had power to 
create federal rules to govern questions of ‘general law’ arising in 
simple diversity cases.”80  In a separate opinion in Southland, Justice 
Stevens went further.  He acknowledged that because Congress did 
not define which grounds for revocation of arbitration agreements are 
permissible in the savings clause, “it would appear that the judiciary 
must fashion the limitations as a matter of federal common law.”81  
Several legal scholars have also noted that the FAA was passed “[i]n 
1925 . . . under the shadow of Swift v. Tyson, which had given to the 
federal courts sitting in diversity the task of creating a general 
common law . . . .  Swift was still alive and well.”82 
To be clear, even if it was the unambiguous understanding of every 
member of Congress that the reference in the savings clause to 
“grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract” was to federal common law and not state law, the savings 
clause they meant to create would not have been the one I am arguing 
in favor of here—one that creates a uniform body of federal common 
law governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements in state and 
federal court.  First, the federal common law created under the 
authority of Swift was not supreme.  It applied only in federal court in 
diversity cases.83  Second, it was not until after 1925 that the Supreme 
 
80 388 U.S. 395, 405 n.13 (1967); see also Southland, 465 U.S. at 28 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“There are . . . references in the legislative history to . . . Congress’ pre-Erie 
power to prescribe ‘general law’ applicable in all federal courts.”). 
81 Southland, 465 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)). 
82 Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 72, at 185 n.38; see also Bruhl, supra note 15, at 
1427 n.19 (“[P]art of the difficulty in fixing the proper application of the FAA stems from 
the fact that it was enacted in 1925, well before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, meaning that the 
statute comes from a period of very different expectations regarding the division between 
state and federal law.” (citations omitted)); Drahozal, supra note 71, at 126 (“[T]he FAA    
. . . was enacted while Swift v. Tyson was still good law.” (internal footnote omitted)); 
Hirshman, supra note 2, at 1314 (“When Congress passed the FAA, federal courts, under 
the regime of Swift v. Tyson, had long been creating federal rules of decision for cases 
within their jurisdiction . . . .” (internal footnote omitted)); Schwartz, supra note 72, at 27 
n.134 (noting that “it could be argued that the intent of the savings clause, drafted under 
the Swift regime, was to incorporate federal common law”). 
83 However, even by 1925 it had become clear that with respect to one set of arbitration 
agreements covered by the FAA—“written provision[s] in any maritime transaction,” 9 
U.S.C. § 2 (1925)—the reference in the savings clause to “such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract” could not have been a reference to state law 
because state law could not have applied to invalidate a maritime contract.  In 1917, the 
Supreme Court held that state law could not apply in a case subject to the federal admiralty 
jurisdiction.  S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).  And in 1920 the Court ruled that 
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Court interpreted the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to pass an 
FAA that could constitutionally govern the enforceability of, for 
example, an arbitration provision in a contract for home extermination 
services that contemplated a purely local transaction.84 
However, when the Court decided Southland in 1984, the expanded 
scope of the commerce power was clear.  So too was the power of 
federal courts to create “real” federal common law—not of the 
Swiftian variety—when authorized to do so by Congress in an area 
where Congress would have had the power to legislate directly.85  
The existence of this latter power is what made Justice Stevens 
suggest in Southland that the FAA’s savings clause could be read as 
had section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 in 
Lincoln Mills as authorizing federal courts to fashion a body of 
federal law for the enforcement of arbitration agreements.86  His 
suggestion, which I am arguing in favor of here, never gained any 
traction.  Justice Stevens was correct that section 301, as interpreted 
in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, offers a compelling 
analogy. 
In Lincoln Mills, a union brought suit in federal district court under 
section 301 for specific enforcement of the arbitration provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement.87  Section 301(a) provides: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce as defined in this [Act] . . . may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 
citizenship of the parties.88 
The Supreme Court explained that in section 301 Congress (as it had 
in the FAA)89 intended to reject the common law rule against specific 
 
efforts by Congress to allow state workers’ compensation laws to apply to workers injured 
within the admiralty jurisdiction were unconstitutional.  Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 
253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
84 The Court concluded that such an arbitration agreement was covered by the FAA in 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  In so doing, Justice Breyer 
explained that “[t]he pre-New Deal Congress that passed the [Federal Arbitration] Act in 
1925 might well have thought the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has turned 
out to be the case.”  Id. at 275; see also, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 71, at 127–29 (outlining 
the Court’s post-1925 expansion of the commerce power). 
85 See Gutoff, supra note 44, at 386–89. 
86 Southland, 465 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
87 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957). 
88 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). 
89 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate.90  And then the 
Court famously wrote: 
[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, 
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor 
laws.  The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes 
some substantive law. . . .  [But other problems] will be solved by 
looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that 
will effectuate that policy.  The range of judicial inventiveness will 
be determined by the nature of the problem.  Federal interpretation 
of the federal law will govern, not state law. . . . 
It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where 
federal rights are concerned.91 
Pursuant to the Court’s direction in Lincoln Mills, the federal 
courts have indeed created a federal common law of collective 
bargaining agreements.  Two of the best-known principles of that 
body of law, stated in the Court’s Steelworkers Trilogy in 1960, 
include (1) a presumption in favor of specific enforcement of 
arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements92 and (2) 
strict limits on the grounds upon which a court can refuse to enforce 
an arbitration award.93 
 
90 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 (“It seems, therefore, clear to us that Congress adopted 
a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by 
implication rejecting the common-law rule . . . against enforcement of executory 
agreements to arbitrate.” (internal footnote and citation omitted)).  Of course, the focus of 
section 301 is arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. 
91 Id. at 456–57 (citations omitted). 
92 See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (holding that the 
court’s inquiry when specific enforcement of the arbitration provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement is sought is to determine whether the party seeking arbitration “is 
making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract”); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960) (holding that an order to 
arbitrate a “particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.”).  American 
Manufacturing and Warrior & Gulf are two of the three cases from the trilogy.  For the 
third, see infra note 93. 
93 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–98 (1960) 
(holding that courts may not review the merits of an arbitration award—an award must be 
enforced unless it is clear the arbitrator did not rely on an interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement).  For more detailed discussions of the content of the federal 
common law of section 301, see Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: 
Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American 
Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469 (1993); Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law 
of Labor Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 
BAYLOR L. REV. 781 (2000); Rebecca Hanner White, Section 301’s Preemption of State 
Law Claims: A Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377 (1990); James B. Zimarowski, 
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The former presumption should look familiar.  As noted earlier, in 
Moses H. Cone, the Court explained that “[s]ection 2 [of the FAA] is 
a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements . . . .  The [Federal] Arbitration Act establishes 
that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”94  
The substantive similarity of the presumptions in favor of arbitration 
read by the Court into the FAA and section 301 is patent.  The 
Court’s language in Moses H. Cone “about the federal pro-arbitration 
policy could have been lifted straight from Lincoln Mills and the 
Steelworkers Trilogy.”95  And, like section 301, the grounds upon 
which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award are strictly 
limited under the FAA.96 
In addition to these similarities, both statutes are rather skeletal.  
The federal courts have, almost by necessity, created federal common 
law to fill in the substantial gaps in section 301 and the FAA.  Section 
301 of the LMRA simply gives the federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements, and section 
203(d) provides that “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by 
the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of 
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an 
existing collective-bargaining agreement.”97  The FAA states simply 
that written arbitration agreements must be enforced save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.98  And of course, both statutes have been read to preempt 
 
Interpreting Collective Bargaining Agreements: Silence, Ambiguity, and NLRA Section 
8(d), 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 465 (1989). 
94 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).  The presumption was not important to resolution of the 
case, but the Court had occasion to apply the FAA presumption twelve years later in 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  There the parties’ 
agreement provided that it would be “governed by the laws of the State of New York.”  Id. 
at 53.  The defendant stockbrokers argued that this provision was intended to incorporate 
New York decisional law forbidding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.  Id. at 
60.  The Court concluded that the intent to preclude an award of punitive damages was not 
clear from the choice-of-law language in the agreement and that under Moses H. Cone, 
doubts were to be resolved in favor of arbitration—here in favor of arbitration of claims 
for punitive damages.  Id. at 62. 
95 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 43 & n.214; see also Bales, supra note 59, at 600–01 
(observing that the Court’s “affinity for arbitration under the FAA” looks strikingly like its 
affinity “for arbitration under section 301 of the LMRA”). 
96 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008) (interpreting 9 
U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006), the judicial review provisions of the FAA). 
97 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (2006). 
98 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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state law that would stand in the way of their primary objectives—
uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements in the case 
of section 301,99 and the “national policy favoring arbitration” in the 
case of the FAA.100 
Notwithstanding these similarities,101 section 301 has been 
completely federalized, but the FAA has not.  I have tried to show 
that a popular justification for that distinction, the language and intent 
of the savings clause, is a shaky foundation for the persistent 
consideration of state law in disputes over the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.  I turn now to another 
possible justification for reserving a role for the operation of state law 
in the FAA’s savings clause—federalism concerns.  Here too I 
conclude that those concerns do not justify refusing to read the 
savings clause to authorize the creation of a uniform body of federal 
common law to govern the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
covered by the FAA. 
IV 
EVALUATING THE THREAT TO FEDERALISM VALUES POSED BY 
READING THE SAVINGS CLAUSE TO REFER TO FEDERAL COMMON 
LAW AND NOT STATE CONTRACT LAW 
Southland has been the target of the most blistering federalism 
critiques.  Justice Scalia has described it as “a permanent, 
unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially 
large class of disputes.”102  Less specific attention has been paid to 
 
99 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). 
100 E.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
101 The FAA’s resemblance to section 301 has often had doctrinal implications.  For 
example, litigants relied on the FAA as grounds for seeking specific enforcement of 
arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements before and after the passage of 
section 301, and “the question . . . [of] the FAA’s applicability to labor arbitration has 
never been resolved.”  Schwartz, supra note 72, at 40–41; see also Wright v. Universal 
Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77 n.1 (1998) (refusing to decide the question); Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 2121 v. Goodrich Corp., 410 F.3d 
204, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting a circuit split on the question).  And the Supreme 
Court has noted, approvingly, that “the federal courts have often looked to the [FAA] for 
guidance in labor arbitration cases” in which the courts are applying section 301.  United 
Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987). 
102 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Professor Schwartz has, like many others, argued that the Court in Southland 
mistakenly attributed to Congress the intent to make the FAA preemptive substantive law.  
Schwartz, supra note 72; see also Schwartz, supra note 59 (arguing in addition that the 
FAA, as interpreted in Southland, results in unconstitutional federal regulation of state-
court procedure). 
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the separate question of the federalism implications of reading the 
savings clause to refer to state or federal law.  That is perhaps 
justifiable.  Regardless of the resolution of the choice-of-law question 
posed by the savings clause, under current doctrine the FAA would 
still preempt all state law that expresses a policy judgment that 
arbitration is a disfavored means of dispute resolution, even for 
disputes over state-created rights.  Justice Stevens made this point in 
Southland: while Congress can create a federal right and guarantee 
judicial enforcement regardless of the terms of a written arbitration 
agreement, the Court’s interpretation of the FAA prevents a state 
legislature from doing the same thing with respect to a state-created 
right.103 
The question whether savings clause disputes about the validity of 
an FAA-covered arbitration agreement are to be governed by state or 
federal common law seems less important given the tremendous 
preemptive force of the rest of the FAA.  And that is one response to 
federalism arguments that might be made in favor of reading the 
savings clause to refer to state law—that all that is at stake there is 
whether state contract law of general application will be used to 
resolve disputes about the enforceability of arbitration agreements.104  
Deciding instead to apply a federal common law of arbitration 
agreements would of course implicate federalism issues, but they are 
less dramatic than the impact of Southland, its ancestors, and its 
progeny on state lawmaking power. 
As noted earlier, reading the savings clause to permit federal courts 
to create federal common law would be consistent with the Court’s 
interpretation of the rest of § 2, pursuant to which federal courts have 
already created a substantial body of preemptive federal common law.  
Lawrence Cunningham has recently examined that body of law in 
detail, criticizing its content as reflecting the Court’s preference for a 
national policy favoring arbitration as opposed to Congress’s intent to 
require simply that arbitration agreements be placed on equal footing 
with other contracts.105 
One of Cunningham’s examples of this federal common law is the 
presumption in favor of arbitration declared by the Court in Moses H. 
 
103 Southland, 465 U.S. at 17–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
104 See supra Part II. 
105 Cunningham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 30) (explaining that the Court has 
“fashioned a separate federal arbitration law, distinct from the common law of contracts, 
[because of] the Court’s determination that there should be a national policy favoring 
arbitration”). 
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Cone and discussed above.106  But he goes on to describe several 
other FAA federal common law doctrines.  For example, as also 
discussed briefly above, the Court has created a federal rule of 
“severability” for arbitration agreements, holding that a challenge to 
the enforceability of a contract containing an arbitration agreement 
should be determined by the arbitrator.107  Only challenges to the 
arbitration agreement itself are reserved for resolution by the court.108  
As Cunningham notes, the Court has been explicit that “the 
severability rule is a ‘matter of substantive federal arbitration law’. . . 
[not] one of state law.”109 
Another example is the presumption created by the Court in First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, reserving for courts (as opposed 
to arbitrators) the power to decide whether the parties to a contract 
agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute.110  Courts should not 
determine whether the parties agreed to have an arbitrator decide the 
arbitrability question, explained the Supreme Court, unless there is 
“‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence” of the parties’ intent to do so.111  
Cunningham is critical of the Court’s rule because it is “alien to 
contract law”112 and because the Court relied on section 301 
jurisprudence in formulating it.113 
For purposes of this Article, the important point that emerges from 
Cunningham’s analysis is that there is already a substantial body of 
FAA federal common law.114  Even though the Court continues to 
follow the dictum in Perry that under the savings clause state contract 
 
106 Id. (manuscript at 3). 
107 Id. (manuscript at 17). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (quoting Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 n.4 (2010)). 
110 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
111 Id. at 944. 
112 Cunningham, supra note 2 (manuscript at 15). 
113 Id. (manuscript at 15 n.99) (referring to AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers 
of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986)).  First Options is not the only case Cunningham analyzes in 
which the Court relied in part on section 301 precedents.  See Cunningham, supra note 2 
(manuscript at 20–21) (discussing Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. 
Ct. 1758 (2010), in which the Court held that the decision of an arbitration panel that an 
arbitration could proceed as a class action must be vacated because (1) the arbitrators 
relied on their own opinions about public policy and not on FAA, maritime, or applicable 
state law; and (2) where the parties’ agreement is silent on the issue, imposing class 
arbitration is inconsistent with the FAA). 
114 This point has been made by others.  See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber, Confusion About 
Class Arbitration, 7 J. TEX. CONSUMER L. 2, 6 (2003) (stating that the Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence “amount[s] to nothing less than a federal common law of arbitration contract 
interpretation”). 
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law of general application can be applied to arbitration agreements 
covered by the FAA, most relevant state law is displaced by a 
“federal common law of arbitration contract interpretation,”115 which 
has been created pursuant to § 2 and the rest of the FAA.  My reading 
of the savings clause, which would oust state contract law of general 
application, would thus constitute only a minor additional imposition 
on state lawmaking power. 
Nevertheless, federalism arguments have been advanced for 
preserving a role for state law in the savings clause.  For example, 
dissenting in Concepcion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) explained that the savings clause 
“retained for the States an important role incident to agreements to 
arbitrate.”116  The dissenters criticized what they characterized as the 
majority’s narrow reading of the scope of the savings clause as being 
inconsistent with the “federalist ideal” of respecting the states as 
independent sovereigns.117 
Professor David Schwartz has undoubtedly been the most thorough 
and among the most articulate of the commentators criticizing the 
Court’s FAA jurisprudence on federalism grounds, and Schwartz has 
focused occasionally on the savings clause and the FAA’s 
relationship to section 301.  Schwartz’s general position on FAA 
preemption, developed in a series of articles, is that there is no 
important federal interest in favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, particularly in state-court actions involving state-law 
claims, and the Court’s interpretation of the FAA to preempt state law 
related to those agreements interferes with a traditional form of state-
law regulation—the law of contracts.118  He thus argues for a more 
limited view of the preemptive reach of the FAA. 
More specifically, Schwartz supports reading the savings clause to 
preserve the operation of state common and statutory law that would 
render arbitration agreements unenforceable so long as that law was 
based on public policy or general contract law concerns and not the 
 
115 Id. 
116 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
117 Id. 
118 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 72; David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of 
Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129 (2004); Schwartz, supra note 59.  In addition, Schwartz 
argues that the FAA is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to regulate 
procedure in state courts.  See Schwartz, supra note 59.  I do not respond separately to that 
argument here. 
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judicial hostility to arbitration the FAA was intended to reverse.119  
However, interpreting the savings clause to authorize the creation and 
application of federal common law and not state law to covered 
arbitration agreements would not be an unusual affront to the 
sovereignty of the states. 
A fully federalized savings clause is no doubt within Congress’s 
power.  The Court has repeatedly declared that the FAA reflects a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,120 and it has identified 
some of the specific federal interests furthered by the FAA’s federal 
policy favoring arbitration.  The Court has explained that 
“[a]rbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of 
litigation”121 because arbitration is, by comparison to litigation, 
simple, informal, and expeditious.122  The majority in Concepcion 
quoted from a House Report on the bill that became the FAA, which 
stated that “the costliness and delays of litigation . . . can be largely 
eliminated by agreements for arbitration.”123  And even Professor 
Schwartz acknowledges possible federal interests in favoring 
enforcement of arbitration agreements—“a general dislike of 
litigation” and “a belief that . . . [enforcement of] arbitration 
agreements [will help] reduce crowded court dockets.”124  Congress’s 
pursuit of those interests through enactment of a statute that applies to 
 
119 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 52–53; see also supra text accompanying note 3 
(explaining that the FAA was passed in order to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration). 
120 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (“[O]ur cases place it beyond dispute that the 
FAA was designed to promote arbitration.”). 
121 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). 
122 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). 
123 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).  In 1994, the U.S. Departments of 
Labor and Commerce concluded that the development of private arbitration alternatives 
for workplace disputes held promise for expanding access to public law rights for lower-
wage workers.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE DUNLOP 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS—FINAL REPORT 
56 (1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/2.  Schwartz 
also suggests the federal interest in fostering arbitration does not outweigh the interests of 
the states in regulating arbitration agreements through contract law and otherwise because 
the Court has consistently stated that the choice to arbitrate does not have predictable 
substantive consequences—that by agreeing to arbitrate a party “does not forgo [the] 
substantive rights . . . [it] only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum.”  Schwartz, supra note 72, at 39.  However, that the Court views an 
arbitration agreement as a type of forum selection clause rather than an agreement to alter 
or waive substantive rights does not mean Congress would have no interest in encouraging 
parties to choose the less costly form of dispute resolution. 
124 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 30. 
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written agreements “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” is 
a constitutional exercise of its commerce power.125 
Reasonable minds can differ on the question whether Congress 
should exercise its power to require aggressive enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in interstate commerce, but it is hard to 
understand why a normative objection to the pursuit of such a policy 
tells us anything about whether it is an appropriate exercise of that 
power as a constitutional matter or as a matter of comity.  One could, 
for example, think that Congress did the right thing when it 
federalized the law of interpretation and enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements in section 301, but that it should have 
refrained from expanding federal diversity jurisdiction over certain 
types of class actions in the Class Action Fairness Act.126  But that 
does not make the former any more appropriate, as a doctrinal matter, 
than the latter. 
For example, Professor Schwartz dismisses as “a false analogy” 
any attempt to justify the preemptive scope of the FAA by reference 
to section 301.127  Only the latter, he asserts, should be understood to 
articulate a national solution to a national problem—the need for 
uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements in the 
private sector and particularly aggressive enforcement of arbitration 
provisions to avoid industrial strife.128  But noting that section 301 
and the FAA address different issues, and that one might conclude 
that federal intervention was warranted in the case of section 301 and 
not the FAA, begs the question whether Congress has the power to 
pursue an interest in aggressive enforcement of arbitration agreements 
by assuring that, within the bounds of its commerce power, federal 
enforcement rules apply and inconsistent state law is preempted.  And 
the answer to that question is, I suggest, simply yes.  It is a defining 
feature of our federalism that state contract law will be displaced if it 
 
125 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
126 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified 
in various sections of 28 U.S.C.) (authorizing expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction in 
“nationwide” class actions in order to subject them to the rigorous class certification 
standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23). 
127 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 7. 
128 Id. at 40–41.  Schwartz is correct that in its section 301 jurisprudence the Court 
concluded that arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements should be 
aggressively enforced because they are the quid pro quo for provisions in which the union 
gives up its right to strike.  Id. at 43.  Enforcing the promises to arbitrate by creating law 
more solicitous of them than standard state contract law was necessary, the Court 
reasoned, to further the federal interest in reducing industrial strife. Textile Workers Union 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455–57 (1957). 
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conflicts with federal law passed within the constitutional limits of 
Congress’s legislative power.129  That some of the state law displaced 
is contract law, an area of traditional state regulation,130 is ultimately 
of no moment.131  Congress has the power to regulate written 
agreements to arbitrate in transactions in interstate commerce, it has 
the power to delegate some of that power to the federal judiciary, and, 
under the Supremacy Clause, the law created by federal judges 
pursuant to that delegation of power displaces inconsistent state 
law.132 
I suspect that disagreement with the content of FAA law 
(particularly its policy favoring enforcement of arbitration 
agreements) is the real source of many of the federalism critiques of 
FAA jurisprudence.  Many of the academics who criticize the Court’s 
interpretation of the FAA on federalism grounds support, as I do, the 
“Arbitration Fairness Act,”133 introduced most recently in Congress 
in May 2011.134  However, its central provision would make 
arbitration agreements unenforceable, as a matter of federal law, if the 
agreements required arbitration of employment, consumer, or civil-
rights claims, including those based on state law.135  I cannot 
conceive of a theory of congressional power under which Congress 
can legitimately forbid states from enforcing agreements to arbitrate 
disputes over state-created rights but not require states to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate disputes over state-created rights. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while the prevailing interpretation of 
the savings clause preserves a limited role for state law in 
enforcement disputes over arbitration agreements, in Concepcion, the 
Court whittled away at that body of state law, which moves § 2 of the 
 
129 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208–09 (1985). 
130 Schwartz, supra note 72, at 5. 
131 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102–04 (1962) (state 
contract law is preempted by federal labor law under section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act where the subject of the controversy is a collective bargaining 
agreement). 
132 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis, Erie, and the New Deal “Constitutional 
Revolution,” 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 257, 263–76 (2001) (by declaring Swift v. Tyson federal 
common law illegitimate, Erie actually charted a course to federal common law based on 
legitimate sources of federal lawmaking power, a federal common law that is binding on 
state courts under the Supremacy Clause). 
133 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2) (“The Arbitration Fairness Act 
should be passed because consumer and employment disputes are too important a hen-
house to be governed by contracts written by foxes . . . .”). 
134 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
135 Id. §§ 401–02. 
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FAA closer to the fully federalized version I am imagining.  Recall 
that in Concepcion the plaintiffs claimed that an arbitration agreement 
with a class action waiver in their cell phone sales and service 
contracts was unenforceable under California’s generally applicable 
law of unconscionability.136  Notwithstanding that the state-law 
doctrine survived the “generally applicable/single-out” test for 
application under the savings clause,137 the Court concluded that the 
state law was preempted.138  Requiring the availability of class-wide 
arbitration, the Court concluded, “interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration”139 because class-wide arbitration is slower, 
more formal, more expensive, and riskier for defendants, all of which 
would make it less likely that parties would enter into arbitration 
agreements, a result contrary to the purpose of the FAA.140 
Thus, the Court in Concepcion constricted the opening created for 
state law under the savings clause.  After Concepcion, to avoid 
preemption, a state law must be generally applicable and not single 
out arbitration agreements for suspect treatment, and that state law 
must not alter what the Court determines to be a fundamental attribute 
of arbitration.  As the dissent correctly observed, the majority has 
now reserved for the Court the right to displace applicable state law 
any time the Court concludes that application of state law would 
result in a dispute resolution process the Court determines cannot 
fairly be characterized as “arbitration.”141  Thus, reading the savings 
clause to refer to federal common law rather than state law would 
displace an ever-shrinking body of state law. 
  
 
136 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
137 See supra Part II. 
138 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
139 Id. at 1748. 
140 Id. at 1748–53.  The Court’s conclusion that arbitration is riskier for defendants, as 
opposed to plaintiffs, whose identical concerns the Court has repeatedly dismissed, is quite 
troubling.  But this is neither the time nor the place to explore that hypocrisy.  While we 
are on the subject of hypocrisy, although in this example congressional hypocrisy, see 10 
U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2010) (making it unlawful for a creditor to extend consumer credit to 
certain members of the armed forces or their dependents “with respect to which . . . the 
creditor requires the borrower to submit to arbitration”). 
141 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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V 
A FULLY FEDERALIZED FAA CAN EFFECTIVELY REGULATE 
“LOPSIDED ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS”142 
In addition to arguing that a prominent role for state law in the 
savings clause is consistent with respect for state sovereignty, many 
commentators have argued that state law provides courts applying the 
FAA the tools necessary to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements 
that strongly favor the drafting party.143  I agree that the FAA should 
not be read to require enforcement of agreements that constitute 
waivers of the substantive rights of the non-drafting party,144 but 
relying on the application of state law through the savings clause is 
not necessary to accomplish that goal.  Displacing state law by 
federalizing the savings clause would not impair the ability of courts 
to refuse to enforce those agreements, and it would rationalize 
arbitration law in this area through the development of a uniform 
federal standard.  Moreover, there is a nascent body of federal law 
ready to do this work. 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. the Supreme Court 
held that the FAA required specific enforcement of an agreement to 
arbitrate claims arising out of the plaintiff’s employment by the 
defendant, specifically a claim asserted by the plaintiff under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).145  The majority 
rejected (1) the plaintiff’s argument that Congress intended for ADEA 
claims to be asserted only in a judicial forum; (2) the plaintiff’s 
“generalized attacks” on the adequacy of arbitral procedures, 
including possible arbitrator bias, limited discovery, the lack of 
written opinions, and possible limitations on the remedial powers of 
arbitrators; and (3) the plaintiff’s argument that an inequality of 
 
142 Bales, supra note 59, at 606 (referring to arbitration agreements in which employers 
“overreach[] by, for example, giving the employer the unilateral authority to” select the 
arbitrator). 
143 For example, Professor Schwartz has argued that the grounds for refusing to enforce 
remedy-stripping provisions in arbitration agreements (such as provisions precluding an 
award of punitive damages where the applicable law would permit it) and provisions that 
make the arbitration procedurally unfair (such as provisions imposing significant costs on 
the non-drafting party) are “purely state law principles.”  Schwartz, supra note 118, at 
143–44.  Professor Bruhl has similarly written that “[t]he main channel that remains open 
to courts skeptical of the increasingly pervasive use of arbitration is a provision of the 
FAA that allows a court to invalidate an arbitration agreement under generally applicable 
state contract principles, such as unconscionability.”  Bruhl, supra note 15, at 1422. 
144 E.g., David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: 
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 55–56 (2003). 
145 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
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bargaining power was grounds for refusing to enforce the arbitration 
agreement.146 
However, the Court emphasized that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather 
than a judicial, forum.”147  Moreover, it explained that while the 
plaintiff’s generalized attacks on arbitral procedures were out of step 
with the contemporary perception of the adequacy of arbitration, 
actual procedural inadequacies could be addressed in specific 
cases,148 and “courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims 
that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or 
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds ‘for the 
revocation of any contract.’”149 
The issue whether the terms of a particular arbitration agreement 
were sufficiently unfair to the non-drafting party to bar enforcement 
was addressed almost ten years later in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph.150  The plaintiff borrowed money from the defendant to 
purchase a mobile home and later sued in federal district court 
alleging violations of the Truth in Lending and Equal Credit 
Opportunity Acts.151  The lender moved to compel arbitration 
pursuant to provisions in the loan documents.152  The plaintiff resisted 
on the ground that the arbitration agreement was silent with respect to 
the payment of filing fees, arbitrator’s costs, and other arbitration 
expenses and therefore failed to guarantee that she could vindicate her 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.153  The majority acknowledged 
that “the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant   
. . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum”154 but concluded that the arbitration agreement’s 
silence on the subject did not satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of showing 
that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive.155 
 
146 Id. at 26–33. 
147 Id. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
148 Id. at 30–33. 
149 Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627). 
150 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
151 Id. at 82–83. 
152 Id. at 83. 
153 Id. at 84. 
154 Id. at 90. 
155 Id. at 90–92.  The dissenting Justices agreed that under Gilmer an arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable if the forum it contemplates is not adequate to adjudicate the 
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Gilmer and Randolph have been read by courts as requiring, as a 
matter of federal law that emanates from the FAA and not pursuant to 
state law under the savings clause, refusal to enforce arbitration 
agreements if the arbitral forum contemplated by the agreement 
would not permit the non-drafting party to effectively vindicate her 
asserted legal rights.  The First Circuit has referred to this doctrine as 
the “vindication of rights analysis.”156  Other courts of appeals have 
articulated similar approaches,157 and legal scholars have noted this 
aspect of FAA law.158  Courts have applied this body of FAA 
 
plaintiff’s claims or if the arbitral forum is not accessible to the party resisting arbitration.  
Id. at 93–94 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  They preferred a rule 
that required the drafting party to demonstrate that the arbitral forum would be financially 
accessible to the plaintiff.  Id. at 94–97. 
156 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2006). 
157 E.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., No. 06-1871-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2012) 
(concluding that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement would deprive plaintiffs 
of the rights under the antitrust laws because any individual recovery would be dwarfed by 
out-of-pocket expert witness fees); EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 479 
F.3d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that Green Tree provides a basis for voiding an 
arbitration agreement beyond that provided by state law); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 
339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (proposing that a legitimate reason to deny arbitration 
may exist if a party would be saddled with prohibitive arbitration costs). 
 The approach outlined in Gilmer and Randolph resembles federal law on the 
enforceability of forum selection clauses, which also focuses on whether the non-drafting 
party will be able to effectively enforce her rights in the alternative forum.  See Vimar 
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995) (forum 
selection clause is unenforceable if it operates as “a prospective waiver of a party’s right to 
pursue statutory remedies”); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) 
(forum selection clauses in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for 
fundamental fairness, which includes consideration of physical and financial impediments 
to the plaintiff’s ability to litigate in the alternative forum).  And the resemblance seems 
appropriate, given that the Supreme Court has stated that an arbitration agreement “is 
effectively a forum selection clause.”  EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 
(2002); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (“An agreement 
to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum selection 
clause . . . .”). 
158 E.g., Bales, supra note 59, at 614–16 (a group of courts has focused on federal law 
to justify refusal to enforce “lopsided” arbitration agreements); Schwartz, supra note 59, at 
549 n.30 (“It stands to reason that a substantive claim should be withheld from arbitration 
if the arbitrator is not authorized to issue a remedy crucial to the claim.  This principle 
follows logically from the Supreme Court’s repeated admonition that ‘[b]y agreeing to 
arbitrate . . . a party does not forego . . . substantive rights . . . .’” (alteration and omissions 
in original)); see also Gilles, supra note 26, at 406–08 (referring to challenges based on 
this body of law as “second-wave,” to distinguish them from challenges based on state 
unconscionability law).  Gilles now uses the more popular “vindication of rights” label to 
refer to this federal law approach.  Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: From 
Unconscionability to Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability   
-to-vindication-of-rights. 
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common law to provisions in arbitration agreements (1) permitting 
the drafting party to control the selection of the arbitrator, (2) limiting 
certain types of damages, (3) imposing filing fees, (4) shortening 
statutes of limitations, (5) limiting discovery, (6) forbidding class 
actions, (7) requiring arbitration of claims asserted by the non-drafter 
against the drafter and not vice-versa, and (8) that give the drafting 
party the unilateral right to modify the arbitration agreement.159 
A particularly rich example is the First Circuit’s decision in 
Kristian v. Comcast Corp. where subscribers to the defendants’ cable 
television services brought suit in federal district court alleging 
defendants violated federal and state (Massachusetts) antitrust laws 
and seeking certification of a class of subscribers.160  The defendants 
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to provisions of the subscriber 
agreements.161 
The plaintiffs argued that enforcement of the arbitration provisions 
as written would make it impossible for them to vindicate their 
federal- and state-law rights and impermissibly shield defendants 
from antitrust liability.162  Specifically, the plaintiffs pointed to the 
following provisions: 
1) [P]articipating in arbitration may result in limited discovery;163 
2) [Y]ou must contact us within one (1) year of the date of the 
occurrence of the event or facts giving rise to a dispute . . . or 
you waive the right to pursue a claim based upon such event, 
facts or dispute;164 
3) In no event shall we or our employees or agents have any 
liability for punitive, treble, exemplary, special, indirect, 
incidental or consequential damages;165 
4) The Company will pay for all reasonable arbitration filing fees 
and arbitrator’s costs and expenses except that you are 
responsible for all costs that you incur in the arbitration, 
including, but not limited to, your expert witnesses or 
attorneys;166 
 
159 See, e.g., Bales, supra note 59, at 585, 607–08, 616–18, 623–27 (collecting cases); 
Schwartz, supra note 144, at 56–59 (collecting cases). 
160 446 F.3d 25, 29–31 (1st Cir. 2006). 
161 Id. at 31. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 42. 
164 Id. at 31, 43. 
165 Id. at 44. 
166 Id. at 50. 
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5) There shall be no right or authority for any claims to be 
arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis or on bases 
involving claims brought in a purported representative capacity 
on behalf of the general public (such as a private attorney 
general), other subscribers, or other persons similarly situated     
. . . .167 
The court of appeals refused to enforce several of those provisions 
and ordered the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis with 
treble damages available on the plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims, and 
attorneys’ fees and costs available on all the plaintiffs’ claims.168  It 
reasoned that the arbitration agreement’s ban on an award of 
attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff conflicted with both 
federal and state antitrust law, which make such awards 
mandatory.169  Given the expense of litigating antitrust actions, “the 
ban on the recovery of attorney’s [sic] fees and costs in the arbitration 
agreements would burden Plaintiffs here with prohibitive arbitration 
costs, preventing Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights in 
arbitration.”170  The court found that the agreement’s prohibition on 
the award of treble damages was inconsistent with federal antitrust 
law, which makes such an award to a prevailing plaintiff mandatory, 
and that the right to receive treble damages could not be prospectively 
waived.171 
In analyzing the enforceability of the ban on class actions in the 
arbitration agreement, the court noted that the potential recoveries for 
individual plaintiffs ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand 
dollars, while preparing a complex antitrust action would likely 
require hundreds of thousands of dollars in expert fees and millions of 
dollars in attorneys’ fees.172  Under those circumstances, the court 
concluded, “If the class mechanism prohibition here is enforced, 
Comcast will be essentially shielded from private consumer antitrust 
enforcement liability, even in cases where it has violated the law.  
Plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights.”173 
The Kristian court’s refusal to enforce the arbitration agreement as 
written was based entirely on its application of federal substantive 
 
167 Id. at 53. 
168 Id. at 64–65. 
169 Id. at 46, 50. 
170 Id. at 52–53. 
171 Id. at 44–48. 
172 Id. at 54–55. 
173 Id. at 61. 
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FAA law and not state law applicable under the savings clause.  The 
court made this explicit: 
 Before the district court, Plaintiffs also challenged the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreements on the basis of 
Massachusetts unconscionability law.  We have focused on a 
vindication of statutory rights analysis, which draws on the federal 
substantive law of arbitrability. . . . 
 . . . . 
 As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the 
vindication of statutory rights analysis and the unconscionability 
analysis.  In fact, many of Plaintiffs’ unconscionability arguments 
are merely reiterations of their vindication of statutory rights 
arguments. . . .  Thus, we see no need to conduct a separate 
unconscionability analysis under Massachusetts law.174 
Kristian is just one example of the power the FAA gives courts to 
refuse to enforce lopsided arbitration agreements, a power that exists 
apart from state law in the savings clause and would therefore survive 
a reinterpretation of the savings clause to refer to federal rather than 
state law.175 
Regardless of whether the savings clause is reinterpreted in the 
way I have suggested, appreciating the existence and content of this 
body of federal common law reveals much about the scope of the 
Concepcion decision and the future of challenges to arbitration 
agreements that constitute waivers of substantive rights.  Much of the 
post-Concepcion commentary focuses on the propriety of what many 
characterize as the Court’s decision to require enforcement of class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements.176  But that characterization 
 
174 Id. at 63–64. 
175 Id.  A more recent example is In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, in 
which the Second Circuit refused to enforce a class action waiver provision in an 
arbitration agreement because the cost of a merchant individually arbitrating an antitrust 
dispute with American Express “would be prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of 
the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”  No. 06-1871-cv, slip op. at 21–22 (2d Cir. 
Feb. 1, 2012). 
 A quiet development that could have dramatic consequences is the recent decision by 
the National Labor Relations Board that an employer violates the NLRA by requiring 
nonunion employees to agree to arbitrate all claims and to refrain from bringing class 
claims.  D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012). 
176 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012); Brian Fitzpatrick, Is the End of Class 
Actions upon Us?, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2011/09/is-the-end-of-class-actions-upon-us; Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html; Ashby Jones, 
After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class Actions?, WALL ST. J. L. 
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overstates the holding in Concepcion.  The Court in Concepcion 
decided only that California’s common law of unconscionability, as 
applied to class action waivers, could not be the basis for refusing to 
enforce a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement covered by 
the FAA.  The Court was explicit that the question it had to decide 
was “whether [the FAA] preempts California’s rule classifying most 
collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable,”177 and it concluded the FAA preempted California 
law because it interfered with “the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”178  The question 
whether a class action waiver might be unenforceable under Gilmer 
and Randolph because it would amount to a waiver of the substantive 
rights asserted by the plaintiff was not presented to or decided by the 
Court.  One might read the relevant Concepcion tea leaves in different 
ways,179 but the question whether a class action waiver in an 
arbitration agreement might be unenforceable as a matter of the 
federal common law of arbitration is undoubtedly an open one.180 
Another apparently open and important question is whether this 
federal common law “vindication of rights” analysis applies to state-
law claims.  In Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc., the Sixth Circuit held 
that in a diversity case the plaintiffs’ objection to enforcement of an 
 
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling      
-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions/?mod=WSJBlog&utm_source=feed 
burner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wsj%2Flaw%2Ffeed+%28WSJ 
.com%3A+Law+Blog%29; David Schwartz, Do-It-Yourself Tort Reform: How the 
Supreme Court Quietly Killed the Class Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2011, 10:52 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/do-it-yourself-tort-reform-how-the-supreme     
-court-quietly-killed-the-class-action. 
177 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011). 
178 Id. at 1753. 
179 Compare id. at 1750–53 (finding that class arbitration, unless it is consensual, is 
inconsistent with the FAA because it requires procedural formality and increased cost and 
greatly increases risks to defendants, creating a substantial deterrent effect on incentives to 
arbitrate), with id. at 1753 (finding that the individual claims here would most likely not go 
unresolved absent the availability of a collective action because defendant AT&T has set 
up an informal dispute resolution system that is quick, easy to use, and likely to result in 
full or excess payment to the customer without the need for arbitration or litigation). 
180 E.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litigation, slip op. at 13 (concluding that 
Concepcion does not address the question whether a class action waiver is enforceable if 
the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that enforcement would prevent them from 
vindicating their federal statutory rights); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 
Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 2671813, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2011) (holding that 
even after Concepcion “the federal common law of arbitrability” precludes enforcement of 
an arbitration clause when doing so would interfere with the substantive federal statutory 
right to pursue a Title VII pattern and practice case on a class-wide basis). 
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arbitration agreement on the ground that they would be forced to bear 
prohibitive costs was to be determined by state “contract defenses . . . 
rather than those found in federal common law.”181  The court 
reasoned that its previous “vindication of rights” cases, in which it 
had found that prohibitive costs could be a basis for refusing to 
enforce an arbitration award, involved instances in which the 
plaintiffs were asserting federal statutory claims, as the plaintiffs did 
in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph.182  Moreover, the court 
continued, applying this “federal common law” where the plaintiff 
was asserting state-law claims would violate the Erie doctrine.183 
To my knowledge, this is the only opinion discussing this issue in 
any detail.  Many courts have applied a “vindication of rights” 
analysis to arbitration agreements in instances where the party 
resisting enforcement was asserting state-law claims,184 but none 
have done so after explicitly considering arguments like those deemed 
convincing by the Sixth Circuit. 
However, the Erie justification for refusing to apply a “vindication 
of rights” analysis to state-law claims can be easily dismissed.  The 
Swift regime was deemed unconstitutional by the Court in Erie 
because federal courts were creating law that applied only in diversity 
cases in federal court, they were doing so even as to matters that 
would have been beyond the legislative power of Congress, and as to 
matters within that power they were doing so pursuant to the diversity 
statute and not a statute delegating Congress’s lawmaking power to 
those courts.185  Applying the FAA’s common law of “vindication of 
rights” to state-law claims does not pose any of those problems.  At 
this point, there is no doubt that the Court views the FAA as creating 
and authorizing the federal courts to create additional federal 
substantive law governing the interpretation and enforcement of 
covered arbitration agreements—federal law that applies in both state 
 
181 448 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 2006). 
182 Id.  The plaintiff in Randolph asserted claims under the Truth in Lending and Equal 
Credit Opportunity Acts.  See also supra text accompanying notes 150–55. 
183 Stutler, 448 F.3d at 347. 
184 E.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (federal and state 
antitrust law claims); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (ADEA and state contract and wrongful discharge claims); Pérez v. Hospitality 
Ventures-Denver LLC, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Colo. 2003) (federal FMLA and state-
law claims); Rembert v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (state common law and statutory claims); Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, No. 
00C-1143, 2000 WL 35440991 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 21, 2000) (class action under state 
consumer protection law). 
185 E.g., Gutoff, supra note 44, at 378–86. 
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and federal courts.  That is the point of Southland, and that type of 
federal common law poses no Erie problem.186 
The question whether the Court intended the “vindication of rights” 
analysis in Gilmer and Randolph to apply to state-law claims is more 
complicated.  On one hand, in both cases the plaintiffs were asserting 
only federal statutory claims.  And in both cases there is language that 
suggests the Court was interested in creating a doctrine that would 
assure that the purposes of those particular federal laws would not be 
frustrated by enforcing the arbitration agreements in question.  In 
Gilmer, the Court characterized its discussion of the plaintiff’s 
critiques of arbitration as an attempt to determine whether “Congress, 
in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims 
under that Act.”187  Similarly, the Court in Randolph stated that a 
question was “whether Congress has evinced an intention to preclude 
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”188 and 
that “the party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden of 
establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the 
statutory claims at issue.”189 
On the other hand, there is no language in Gilmer or Randolph that 
explicitly limits the “vindication of rights” analysis to federal 
statutory claims.  The Court identified separate bases for refusing to 
enforce arbitration agreements, only one of which is limited to federal 
claims.  That approach requires a court to consider whether Congress 
intended to prevent arbitration of disputes over the rights it created in 
a particular statute.  For example, in Gilmer the Court explained that 
if Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for 
ADEA claims it would “be discoverable in the text of the ADEA, its 
legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration and 
the ADEA’s underlying purposes.”190  That inquiry, to be sure, 
involves an exploration of the specific statutory scheme the plaintiff is 
 
186 Id. at 386–89 (explaining the theory of congressional delegation as a justification for 
federal common law). 
187 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
188 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
189 Id. at 92. 
190 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
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invoking.191  And that inquiry is limited to federal claims under 
Southland.192 
But that inquiry is separate from the question whether a court asked 
to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA could refuse to do 
so on the ground that the terms of the agreement effectively 
diminished the rights, whether created by federal or state law, that the 
plaintiff is asserting.  The Court in Randolph recognized that, 
regardless of the resolution of the question whether Congress 
intended to guarantee the availability of a judicial forum for disputes 
over the rights it created in the Truth in Lending and Equal Credit 
Opportunity Acts, a court should refuse to enforce an arbitration 
agreement if enforcement of its terms would force a plaintiff to forgo 
or seriously compromise those substantive law claims.193 
It is difficult to imagine why this latter defense to enforcement—
“vindication of rights” analysis—would be available only in federal 
question cases.  If, for example, an arbitration agreement covered by 
the FAA required a plaintiff to pay a “filing fee” of $50,000, did the 
Court in Randolph anticipate that a court could rely on federal 
common law to refuse to enforce that agreement with respect to 
federal claims asserted by plaintiff but not state-law claims?  A more 
sensible interpretation would be that when the Court in Gilmer wrote, 
“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum,”194 the Court 
meant to distinguish between “real” arbitration agreements—those 
 
191 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, No. 10-948 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2012) (concluding that 
there is no “congressional command” in the Credit Repair Organization Act that would 
override the mandate of the FAA). 
192 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26–29 (considering the articulated purposes of the statute, its 
substantive proscriptions, and its remedial scheme, including the role of the EEOC).  A 
similar inquiry, determining whether the state legislature that created a state-law cause of 
action intended to guarantee a judicial forum for resolution of claims, is prohibited under 
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence.  As Justice Stevens explained in Southland, under the 
Court’s interpretation of the FAA, Congress can create a federal right and guarantee 
judicial enforcement regardless of a written arbitration agreement, but a state legislature 
may not do the same thing with respect to a state-created right.  Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17–22 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also supra text accompanying note 103. 
193 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90, 92 (plaintiff could successfully resist enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement by showing that Congress intended to prohibit arbitration of the 
claims she was asserting or by showing that the costs of an arbitration would be so high as 
to prevent plaintiff from asserting her claims). 
194 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (alteration in original). 
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presumptively enforceable under the FAA—and agreements to waive 
or otherwise compromise substantive rights—agreements that 
Congress did not intend to require courts to enforce.195  And in the 
language of the savings clause, that a contract contains a prospective 
waiver of substantive-law rights may constitute “grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”196 
Undoubtedly, one effect of federalizing the savings clause would 
be to draw “vindication of rights” analysis in from the shadows and 
accelerate the turn away from state unconscionability law, although 
that will no doubt be one consequence of the Court’s decision in 
Concepcion.197  The “vindication of rights” analysis is not well 
developed, so there are other unanswered questions courts will have 
to confront in applying the doctrine.198  But the uncertainty about the 
 
195 Courts applying the FAA “vindication of rights” approach to a state-law claim might 
nevertheless need to identify with some specificity the nature of the state right being 
asserted.  For example, if a plaintiff asserting a claim under state law seeks to avoid 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement that contains a cap on damages, a court would 
need to determine whether the cap was inconsistent with the remedies that would be 
available to plaintiff if she asserted the claim in court.  If the “vindication of rights” 
analysis turns on whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement constitutes a 
prospective waiver of substantive rights, a court might need to determine whether a 
particular state-law right is waivable.  See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 49–50 
(2006) (considering whether an individual may waive rights under Massachusetts antitrust 
law). 
196 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
197 See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text. 
198 See Bales, supra note 59, at 624–25 (describing conflicting decisions on whether 
various provisions justify refusal to enforce arbitration agreements).  Other questions are 
reflected in the First Circuit’s Kristian decision, discussed supra notes 160–75 and 
accompanying text.  Among the most important is how the Supreme Court’s rulings on 
allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators will play out in the “vindication of 
rights” context.  For example, in Kristian, the court interpreted those cases as reserving for 
the court the questions whether (1) the limitation on damages in the arbitration agreement 
interfered with plaintiffs’ rights under federal antitrust laws, and (2) the agreement’s 
prohibition on an award of costs and attorney’s fees and class arbitration interfered with 
plaintiffs’ rights under federal and state antitrust laws.  Kristian, 443 F.3d at 64.  By 
contrast, the court ruled that the arbitrator was to decide the questions whether (1) the 
statute of limitations set forth in the arbitration agreement must yield to the longer statutes 
of limitations available under both state and federal law, and (2) the limitation on damages 
in the arbitration agreement must yield to the treble damages provision of state antitrust 
law.  Id.  How the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 
2772 (2010), will apply to “vindication of rights” arguments made where an arbitration 
agreement delegates to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to decide disputes relating to 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement likewise remains to be resolved.  And 
finally, although by no means is this an exhaustive list, courts will have to consider, as the 
court did in Kristian, whether offending provisions of an arbitration agreement can be 
severed and an arbitration should be ordered consistent with the rights established by the 
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ultimate answer to some of these questions should not deflect 
attention from the appropriateness of federalizing the savings clause 
with a “vindication of rights” analysis at its core.199 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Arbitration Act now controls the interpretation and 
enforcement of the vast majority of arbitration agreements executed 
in the United States.  The expansion of the FAA’s scope and the 
Court’s pursuit of the policy favoring arbitration have been closely 
scrutinized and much criticized.  The prevailing interpretation of the 
savings clause as referring to state law, on the other hand, has mostly 
escaped attention and criticism.  Some of the satisfaction with the 
prevailing interpretation can be explained by the perception among 
those opposed to mandatory arbitration that the availability of state 
law in the savings clause is the only possible means of relief from the 
FAA’s unflinching support of arbitration. 
But the FAA’s savings clause is worthy of more rigorous 
inspection.  As I have shown, the proper interpretation of the clause is 
an open question.  Under my proposed alternative to the status quo, 
state law would play no role in savings clause litigation and would be 
replaced by federal common law.  That interpretation is perhaps 
consistent with legislative intent; it is consistent with section 301 of 
the LMRA, an analogous federal statute; and it would greatly simplify 
and unify FAA law by replacing the current mix of federal and state 
law with a single federal standard.  And although there is good reason 
to think that a federal common law standard would also reflect the 
current Supreme Court’s preference for arbitration, under existing 
Supreme Court precedent, arbitration agreements can be and are 
scrutinized under a federal standard to assure that they do not result in 
a waiver of the rights proposed to be arbitrated—the so-called 
“vindication of rights” approach. 
 
law plaintiff seeks to enforce, or whether to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement in 
toto.  See 443 F.3d at 48, 53, 61–63. 
199 Similarly, there is a body of federal law to which courts could turn in trying to 
determine whether an arbitration agreement was the product of fraud or duress.  For 
example, the Court has explained that forum selection clauses should not be enforced if 
their incorporation into a contract was the result of fraud, undue influence, or 
overwhelming bargaining power.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 
591 (1991); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972); see also Rivera v. 
Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing the federal 
common law of fraud and overreaching in the context of a dispute over the enforceability 
of a forum selection clause). 
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The specific contours of this approach remain hazy, in large 
measure because of the focus of litigants, some courts, and legal 
scholars on preserving the role of state law, particularly the state law 
of unconscionability, as the means for resisting enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.  However, the Court continued to close the 
door to this approach in Concepcion, so the scope of the “vindication 
of rights” doctrine has never been more important. 
Even for those who are not persuaded by my arguments about 
reinterpreting the savings clause, the question of whether there is a 
robust body of federal law under which lopsided arbitration 
agreements will not be enforced should be of great interest.  And that 
might be especially so for those interested in the subject of this 
Scholarship Series, “ADR for the Masses.”  How this body of law 
develops may determine, to a very large extent, whether the courts 
remain available to adjudicate claims by “the masses”—particularly 
consumers and employees—against banks, telephone companies, 
insurers, and others who are in a position to require the waiver of a 
judicial forum as a condition of employment, a loan, a credit card, 
telephone service, insurance, and other products and services. 
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